Recent years, an explosion of cyber-attack accidents once more sound the alarm on the significance of cyber-security issue. For the sake of establishing robust panoramic defense architecture in modern Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS), an effective and quantitative vulnerability assessment of CPPS is in desperate demand. Consequently, based on the detailed induction and analysis of general framework of cyber-attack, a quantitative assessment method is proposed in the paper from the aspects of both attackers and defenders. In the first place, the probability of selecting access point from the attacker's view is quantized through the scoring of the three properties of information security, the penetration difficulty and the impact of vulnerability. Then, the impact assessment of defender and attacker strategies is discussed via the analysis of both positive and negative aspects. Afterwards, by means of the solving the linear programming issue, the optimal determination of strategy-selection is realized via Nash Equilibrium of Mixed Strategy(NEMS) algorithm. The reasonability of the proposed assessment framework together with future research work are demonstrated at the end of paper.
Introduction
The cyber-security issue has attracted increasing attention from researchers and system managers as the occurrence of severe cyber-attack accidents towards the Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS) has experienced explosive growth in recent years. In 2010, the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of Iranian nuclear facility was invaded and heavily destroyed by the "Stuxnet" virus [1] . On December 23, 2015, due to the attack of malicious code "Black Energy", the Ukrainian power grid suffered serious power outages, which was considered as the first cyber-attack accident against grid infrastructures [2] ; Besides, on 25 January, 2016, the Israel electricity administration was also attacked by Ransomware blackmail software [3] , fortunately the virus was detected and eliminated thanks to the timely and efficient defense strategies.
On encountering severe challenges, the CPPS longs for efficient methods for the assessment of vulnerability and the modelling of attack procedure so as to optimize the defense strategy as far as possible. According to the attack and defense context, both sides make individual decisions of strategies while questing for maximum payoff, the procedure of which could therefore be considered as the interaction of two players in non-cooperative strategic game [3] . Various research have been dedicated to the vulnerability assessment, like [4] [5] proposed a common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS), [6] presents a unified formalism for CPS modelling, however most of these research require high computational power in networks which is beyond the capacity of realistic application, besides, the interaction between the attacker and defender is ignored, hence authentic assessment fails to be fully achieved. This paper therefore proposes an improved quantitative technique of cyber-attack assessment on fully considering the integrity, availability and confidentiality property of information security at first, then adopts the non-cooperative attack-defense game (ADG) model to establish the impact matrix of different strategies, afterwards employs the Nash Equilibrium [7] algorithm to solve the linear programming issue and obtain the optimal selection results of strategies from both attacker and defender aspects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section Ⅱ presents the general cyber-attack framework. Section Ⅲ demonstrates the methodology of quantitative assessment. Section Ⅳ states the optimal modelling of strategy-selection. Section Ⅴ concludes the performance of proposed methods and highlights several key points in further study.
Modes of Cyber Attack
General cyber kill-chain can be divided into two stages-the invasion stage and the attack stage (Fig.1 ). For launching a high level of attack, attackers have to follow the steps of the two stages in the mode. Meanwhile, the attack traces of hackers can also be identified by the target defense system according to the steps. Stage 1: First, attackers obtain the organizational structure and vulnerability information of the target system by means of prior field or network investigations, and then select the malware type and carrier to make the attack weapon, which will be delivered into the target system randomly or deliberately through social engineering means based on the locating information of the target system. Once the user is trapped, the malware will be released and implanted immediately, which then expand and permeate horizontally based on the infected workstations, in the meantime build up secluded communication channel with the attacker through the vulnerabilities or back doors. During the whole process, the malware collect certificates constantly and establish persistent connection of access, all of which are prepared for launching the attack of Stage 2. Based on the highly self-adaptability, the implanted malware develops rapidly via local connections and certificates obtained in the previous stage in the whole system environment. Attackers tamper the configuration setting of existing components as to achieve the interaction with the power distribution management system; on the other side, aiming at serial interfaces, develop specific destructive firmware. Prior to the final whistle, professional hacker team will commission careful tests and evaluation of the system controlled. During all-out offensive, the attackers employ the local software to obtain the direct control rights of the target infrastructure, and then modify the operating parameters or directly destroy the system in order to cause outages of facilities. Afterwards, the attackers implant the firmware specially developed in advance into specific command channels as to prevent the recovery of infrastructures, then clean up the system logs and overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR), finally erase critical files or force shutdown of the target system.
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Impact of Cyber Attack
Generally, an accomplished cyber-attack will cause violation of three properties of information security, including integrity, availability and confidentiality. Loss of integrity renders attackers the ability to modify control commands or measurement data; Loss of availability results in the loss of control over data-collection of remote power devices; Loss of confidentiality results in the divulgement of critical information like password of administrator, private encryption keys etc.
For the sake of quantitative assessment of attack, the impact level of losing the property and the corresponding detailed description are shown in Tab.2.
Property
Level Description
I int
High
Complete loss of integrity or protection. Attackers could modify any files protected or use malicious modification to achieve serious consequence.
Low
Modification of some data is possible, but the consequence or the amount of modification is constrained.
I avail
High
Sustained or persistent loss of availability. Attackers could fully deny access to resources, or prohibit novel connections even when fail to disrupt existing ones.
Low
Reduced interruptions in availability. Attackers are incapable to completely deny service to legitimate users.
I conf
High
All resources are divulged to attackers or only some critical information is disclosed Low Access to some restricted information is obtained, but attacker does not have control over kind or degree. 
Quantitative assessment of cyber-attack
In view of the general attack framework discussed above, this section proposes a quantitative effectiveness assessment of the cyber-attack, including the selection of penetration point
Advances in Computer Science Research, volume 62
from the attacker's view and the comprehensive assessment of impact of both defending and attack strategies.
Selection of penetration point
Generally speaking, the selection of penetration point of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack always carefully takes the feature of target and the complexity of attack into consideration, including the following issues as shown in Tab.3 with corresponding quantitative description.
Aspects Factor
Feature of target Table 4 : Definition of penetration difficulty
The impact of vulnerability i (V i ) in device n after being successfully penetrated denoted as I vul,i depends on various factors with the form as (1).
where,  i represents a vector of three Boolean variables with the value 1 or 0, which denotes whether the exploitation of V i introduce the loss of integrity, availability or confidentiality; Vector I n indicates the impact on target system n after the damage of the three properties aforementioned, the actual value of which depends on the topological structure in CPPS.
Based on the quantitative analysis of I vul,i , the probability of selection of V i from the view of attacker could consequently be calculated as (4) 
Assessment of defending strategy
When the penetration of system is achieved, the attackers consider next-step exploitation on collecting constantly certificates and privileges of legitimate users. In the meantime, the defenders consider proper strategies to improve the reliability of the CPPS, the whole procedure of which exactly conforms to the principle of double-person ADG model. Nevertheless, due to the increasingly higher requirement of real-time data-transmission and dynamic analysis, the defence strategy will inevitably introduce more or less opposite forces in the performance of power system.
The positive impact of defense strategy is conducted to improve the security properties of target system, such as, the employment of user interaction with password authentication could enhance the data integrity, the installation of vulnerability patch contributes to the data confidentiality etc., all of which could be concluded as follows:
where, S against the attack of vulnerability j (V j ),  k,j represents a vector with two influence factors for reducing the impact of losing the integrity and confidentiality, respectively, as shown in (6) .
For the sake of improving the reliability of CPPS, it is unavoidable for the defence strategy to employ encryption techniques, which will certainly bring in negative effect on real-time monitoring and response due to lack of computational capability in most of remote terminal units, consequently the property of data availability is damaged, described as follows: 
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solve the linear programming issue and finally obtains the optimal selection results of strategies from the perspectives of both attacker and defender. Compared to other approaches reported in literature, the proposed framework fully takes the interaction between attacker and defender into consideration. Additionally, the adaptability of method is as well improved as most of the efficient protection measures adopted in computer networks are unfit to the real application in establishing robust defense system of CPPS. Future research work will be dedicated to more simulation and field tests to evaluate the performance of strategy-selection in general cyber-attack.
